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COMMENTS 
WAIVERS OF ERISA PLAN BENEFITS:  PREVENTING JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATIONS OF A COMPLEX STATUTE FROM 
FRUSTRATING THE STATUTE’S SIMPLE PURPOSE 
JEFFREY M. GORRIS†
INTRODUCTION 
A woman has just lost her husband.  Among the many other 
things on her mind, she is worried about her financial security.  She 
has just retired, and her recently deceased husband was two years 
from retirement.  They had planned to fund their retirement through 
his money purchase pension plan.1  She contacts his pension plan 
administrator to receive the death benefit payable upon her hus-
band’s passing.  The plan administrator informs her that the pension 
plan documents show that the beneficiary is not her, but rather her 
husband’s ex-wife.  The surviving spouse informs the plan administra-
tor that the ex-wife waived her right to the pension plan many years 
ago in a divorce agreement with her then-husband.  Who receives the 
pension money?2
 † J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2007; B.B.A. University of 
Notre Dame, 2000.  I would like to thank Ryan McCarthy, Rachel Brodin, and Andrew 
Bonnes for their skillful editing and valuable suggestions.  I would also like to thank 
the Board, Senior Editors, and Associate Editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review for their assistance in improving this Comment.  Finally, I would like to thank 
Stephanie Cory and my family for their help and support.  All errors are my own. 
1 A money purchase pension plan is a defined contribution pension plan gov-
erned by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  See 6 DAVID 
L. BACON & DAVID W. TUCKER, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 150.04[2] (2006) (dis-
cussing the attributes of money purchase pension plans). 
2 In this situation, ERISA partially protects the interest of the surviving spouse by 
requiring that a surviving spouse receive at least fifty percent of the pension plan bal-
ance as a qualified preretirement survivor annuity (QPSA).  29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)(2) 
(2000).  See generally BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 150.06[7] (providing an in-
depth discussion of ERISA’s survivor benefit rules).  A QPSA must be provided to the 
surviving spouse of a vested participant in certain ERISA-defined benefit plans or 
money purchase pension plans who dies before the annuity starting date.  29 U.S.C.  
§ 1055(a) (2000).  In a situation where a living participant is already receiving pension 
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The answer to this question is the subject of a long-lived circuit 
split in the federal courts.3  At issue is “whether administrators of an 
ERISA plan are required to recognize a beneficiary’s waiver of his or 
her benefits.”4  The issue has been addressed in numerous federal ap-
pellate decisions over the last fifteen years.  The majority view, known 
as the “federal common law approach,” holds that beneficiaries may 
effectively waive their rights to the benefits of an ERISA plan if the 
waiver meets certain criteria determined under federal common law.5  
The “minority rule,” by contrast, contends that beneficiaries may not 
waive their rights to the benefits of an ERISA plan, and that the plan 
administrator therefore must pay the beneficiary listed in the plan 
documents.6
This Comment argues that the federal common law approach is 
the preferable rule to apply when evaluating waivers of benefits by  
ERISA plan beneficiaries.  The federal common law approach better 
benefits, ERISA contains a parallel provision for a qualified joint and survivor annuity 
(QJSA).  Id.  A QJSA requires that a surviving spouse continue to receive at least fifty 
percent of pension benefit payments received during the joint lives of the participant 
and spouse.  Id. § 1055(d)(1).  Thus, even if the beneficiary’s waiver is ineffective, the 
surviving spouse will still receive fifty percent of the benefit with the remaining fifty 
percent going to the named beneficiary. 
3 See George A. Norwood, Who Is Entitled To Receive a Deceased Participant’s ERISA 
Retirement Plan Benefits—An Ex-Spouse or Current Spouse?  The Federal Circuits Have an Ir-
reconcilable Conflict, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 61, 65-71 (1998) (detailing the history of the cir-
cuit split); Keron A. Wright, Comment, “Stuck on You”:  The Inability of an Ex-Spouse to 
Waive Rights Under an ERISA Pension Plan [McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241 
(3d Cir. 2005)], 45 WASHBURN L.J. 687, 694-95 (2006) (discussing the approaches of 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits); Donald P. Carleen, Refusal To Honor Beneficiary’s Waiver 
of Pension Benefits Is Upheld, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 16, 2005, at 3, 5 (analyzing the circuit split in 
light of McGowan, a recent decision by the Third Circuit). 
4 McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 
05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007).  “ERISA” refers to the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). 
5 E.g., Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1995); Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
18 F.3d 1321, 1327 (5th Cir. 1994); Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension 
Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
6 The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit whose decisions comprehensively support 
the minority view.  See, e.g., McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that ERISA’s “clear statutory command” requires the court to give effect to the 
plain language of the plan).  A recent Third Circuit decision held in favor of the mi-
nority view for certain ERISA plans.  McGowan, 423 F.3d at 245-46.  The Second Circuit 
has indicated its preference for the minority view in dicta.  See Krishna v. Colgate Pal-
molive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1993) (“It would be counterproductive to compel the 
Policy administrator to look beyond [beneficiary] designations into varying state laws 
regarding wills, trusts and estates, or domestic relations to determine the proper bene-
ficiaries of Policy distributions.”). 
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serves ERISA’s equitable purpose of safeguarding employees’ rights to 
their plan benefits while remaining consistent with ERISA’s statutory 
language.  Part I provides an overview of ERISA and its relevant provi-
sions.  Part II reviews the minority rule by examining the three pri-
mary arguments advocated by its proponents.  Part III examines the 
federal common law approach and the decisions of the circuits that 
support it.  Finally, Part IV discusses the reasons why the federal 
common law approach should govern waivers of ERISA plan benefits 
by nonparticipant beneficiaries. 
I.  ERISA 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19747 (ERISA) 
is the principal federal statute that regulates employee benefit plans.  
ERISA is a wide-reaching statute that covers most employee benefit 
plans8 and affects a majority of the U.S. population.9
A.  Types of ERISA Plans 
There are two types of ERISA employee benefit plans:  “employee 
welfare benefit plan[s]”10 (welfare plans) and “employee pension bene-
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). 
8 See id. § 1003 (defining ERISA’s scope).  The primary employee benefit plans 
that are not covered by ERISA include government plans, church plans, plans “main-
tained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation 
laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws,” plans “maintained 
outside of the United States primarily for the benefit of persons substantially all of 
whom are nonresident aliens,” and unfunded excess benefit plans.  Id. § 1003(b). 
9 See Craig Copeland, Retirement Plan Participation and Retirees’ Perception of Their 
Standard of Living, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Employee Benefits Research Inst., Wash., D.C.), 
Jan. 2006, at 1, 31, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_IB_01-2006.pdf  
(“[T]he extent of employment-based retirement plan use over workers’ lifetimes is 
significantly greater than . . . 50 percent.”). 
10 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000) (emphasis added).  An employee welfare benefit 
plan is 
any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or 
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, 
or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for 
its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the 
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation 
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, 
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services . . . . 
Id. 
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fit plan[s]”11 (pension plans).  Pension plans can be categorized fur-
ther as either “defined contribution plan[s]” (also called “individual 
account plans”)12 or “defined benefit plan[s].”13  Within this statutory 
structure, beneficiary waiver disputes most frequently arise in three 
contexts:  employer-provided life insurance welfare plans,14 defined 
benefit pension plans,15 and money purchase pension plans.16  Bene-
ficiary waivers rarely arise in connection with 401(k) plans because the 
ERISA provisions surrounding qualified preretirement survivor annui-
ties (QPSAs) and qualified joint and survivor annuities (QJSAs)17 have 
led most 401(k) plans to include a provision requiring that the em-
ployee’s spouse receive the balance in the participant’s account upon 
the participant’s death, unless the spouse waives her rights in writing 
prior to the designation of an alternate beneficiary.18  Because not all 
11 Id. § 1002(2)(A).  An employee pension benefit plan is: 
any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or 
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express 
terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or pro-
gram— 
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or  
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the 
termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of 
calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the 
benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan. 
Id. 
12 Id. § 1002(34).  A defined contribution plan is “a pension plan which provides 
for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the 
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and 
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to 
such participant’s account.”  Id.  The distinguishing feature of defined contribution 
plans is that the employee bears the investment risk for the contributed funds and thus 
is not guaranteed a particular amount at retirement.  BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1,  
§ 148.05[1].  Examples of common defined contribution pension plans include money 
purchase pension plans, 401(k) plans, and profit sharing plans.  Id. 
13 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2000).  A defined benefit plan generally is “a pension 
plan other than an individual account plan.”  Id.  A defined benefit plan guarantees 
the participant specified benefits upon retirement.  BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 
148.05[2].  Hence, the employer bears the investment risk.  Id. 
14 E.g., Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1994). 
15 E.g., Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 
275, 277 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Trs. of Iron Workers Local 451 Annuity Fund v. 
O’Brien, 937 F. Supp. 346, 347 (D. Del. 1996). 
16 E.g., McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 310-11 (6th Cir. 1990). 
17 See supra note 2 (discussing ERISA’s QPSA and QJSA requirements). 
18 See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)-(b)(1)(C) (2000) (providing for QPSAs and QJSAs in 
most individual account plans). 
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ERISA provisions apply to each plan type, it is critical to know the ER-
ISA plan type when analyzing a beneficiary waiver claim. 
B.  Purpose and Regulatory Scheme 
“ERISA is an intricate, comprehensive statute”19 with dual pur-
poses.20  The first and primary purpose is “to promote the interests of 
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”21  The 
second purpose is to ensure “that ERISA plans be uniform in their in-
terpretation and simple in their application.”22  The first purpose of 
ERISA can be regarded as protecting employees and the second as 
protecting employers.23
ERISA pursues its objectives through a federal regulatory scheme 
of reporting and disclosure requirements24 and fiduciary responsibility 
provisions25 for all ERISA plans.  Additionally, ERISA imposes partici-
pation, vesting, and funding requirements on pension plans.26  In or-
der to effect the administration and enforcement of ERISA’s regula-
tory scheme in light of state regulation of retirement benefits, 
Congress added an expansive preemption clause, which states that 
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate 
to any employee benefit plan.”27  The Supreme Court broadly inter-
19 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997). 
20 See McMahon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 162 F.3d 28, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1998) (setting 
out ERISA’s two primary purposes). 
21 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); see also Michael Allen, The 
Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the Private Pension Plan Reform Movement, in JOHN 
H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 68, 70 (3d ed. 
2000) (explaining how the failure of Studebaker’s pension plan prompted concern 
about the security of pension benefits and thus influenced the enactment of ERISA).  
Promoting the interests of participants and their beneficiaries is a far-reaching objec-
tive with many components.  See BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 147.01 (setting forth 
ERISA’s purposes in detail). 
22 McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990). 
23 See Demars v. CIGNA Corp., 173 F.3d 443, 446 (1st Cir. 1999) (“In passing  
ERISA, Congress’s purpose was twofold:  to protect employees and to protect employ-
ers.”).  Classifying the second purpose of ERISA as protecting employers is an accurate, 
but simplified, statement.  The rationale underlying the second purpose of ERISA is to 
protect employers, so that employers will be willing to sponsor ERISA plans. 
24 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (2000). 
25 See id. §§ 1101-14. 
26 See id. §§ 1051-85. 
27 Id. § 1144(a).  The preemption provision was expanded by the Conference 
Committee just prior to Congress’s final approval of ERISA.  See Donald T. Bogan, Pro-
tecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA:  Will the Supreme Court Allow States To Regulate Man-
aged Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 977-85 (2000).  “The original House-passed version of 
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preted this provision when it held that ERISA preempts state law that 
either “conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate 
its objects.”28
This expansive preemption provision creates gaps where the state 
law addressing an issue is preempted, and ERISA does not itself con-
tain specific rules on the issue.29  Any gaps created by preemption are 
to be filled by a court-developed “federal common law of rights and 
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.”30  All the courts that have 
addressed the issue agree that ERISA preempts state law in connec-
tion with beneficiary waivers.31  The important question is whether  
ERISA and the original Senate version both contained a limited preemption clause 
expressly tied to ERISA’s focus on pension regulation.”  Id. at 978.  The final version 
preempted “all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.”  Id. 
at 986 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1994)). 
28 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997).  Preemption is essential to achieving 
the second purpose of ERISA.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text (identifying 
the second purpose of ERISA as providing for uniformity and simplicity in administra-
tion).  The Supreme Court recognized the tie between expansive preemption and 
Congress’s objective of simple plan administration in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne: 
It is . . . clear that ERISA’s pre-emption provision was prompted by recogni-
tion that employers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are 
faced with the task of coordinating complex administrative activities.  A 
patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies 
in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing 
plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopt-
ing them. Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit 
plan will be governed by only a single set of regulations. 
482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). 
29 ERISA’s wide-sweeping preemption “creates a ‘regulatory vacuum,’” which 
could lead to “situation[s] of ‘almost palpable unfairness’” unless the federal courts 
“develop federal common law remedies pursuant to ERISA in order to fill the vac-
uum.”  Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Comment, ERISA Preemption and the Case for a Federal Com-
mon Law of Agency Governing Employer-Administrators, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 224 (2001).  
Fairfield argues that the federal courts should adopt a common law of agency “that 
conducts a fact-sensitive analysis of the relationship between the employee, the em-
ployer, and the insurer.”  Id. at 225. 
30 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (quoting Pilot 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)). 
31 See, e.g., McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, No. 05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007) (relying on Boggs, 520 U.S. at 
841); Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that the issue of beneficiary waivers is governed by federal common law without 
addressing the question of preemption); Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 
1995) (noting that, while state law is preempted, “federal courts may look to state law 
for guidance in developing federal common law”); Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 
F.3d 1321, 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he designation of a beneficiary ‘relates to’ the 
provision of an ERISA plan to a sufficient degree to be preempted by that statute.”); 
Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 14-16 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the use of 
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ERISA specifically addresses beneficiary waivers, or if beneficiary waiv-
ers exist in one of the gaps created by preemption and should fall un-
der the purview of federal common law.32
C.  ERISA Provisions Applicable to the Debate over Beneficiary Waivers 
ERISA has numerous provisions,33 two of which are particularly 
relevant to waivers by beneficiaries:  the fiduciary duties provision and 
the anti-alienation provision. 
1.  Fiduciary Duties Provision 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties provision, § 1104, details the responsibili-
ties of a plan fiduciary—the plan administrator or trustee, for exam-
ple—as he performs his duties.34  Section 1104(a)(1) provides, in rele-
vant part, that 
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—(A) for the exclusive 
purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; 
and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; . . . 
and (D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan 
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with  
[ERISA].
35
This provision, including the requirement that the plan adminis-
trator discharge his duties “in accordance with the [plan] docu-
ments,”36 applies to the plan administrator’s distribution of the death 
benefit after the participant dies.37  Because the plan administrator 
must determine the proper beneficiary, the validity of a beneficiary’s 
state law where the plan administrator interpleads claimants); Fox Valley & Vicinity 
Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) 
(“Because ERISA preempts state pension benefit laws, we must find the answer to this 
issue within ERISA itself or in the federal common law interpreting ERISA.” (citation 
omitted)); McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[ERISA’s] preemp-
tion provision is to be construed broadly . . . .”). 
32 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing the two approaches 
courts have followed). 
33 See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (describing ERISA’s structure and 
objectives). 
34 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000). 
35 Id. § 1104(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
36 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 
37 ERISA plan administrators must make death distributions to beneficiaries.  See 
BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 150.06[11][c]. 
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waiver can become a contested issue in the death benefit distribu-
tion.38
2.  Anti-Alienation Provision 
ERISA also contains an anti-alienation, or “spendthrift,” provision 
in § 1056(d).39  The congressional policy behind this provision is “to 
safeguard a stream of income for pensioners . . . and their depend-
ents.”40  The provision requires “[e]ach pension plan [to] provide that 
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”41  
The stated exception to this provision condones only two types of 
transactions:  (1) “any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to 
exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment”42 and (2) the “assign-
ment . . . of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant 
pursuant to . . . a qualified domestic relations order,” or QDRO.43
38 Determining the proper beneficiary can be a challenge when the beneficiary 
form on file with the plan administrator designates an ex-spouse who has subsequently 
waived her right to the benefits in a divorce property settlement.  See, e.g., Fox Valley & 
Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 282 (7th Cir. 1990) (en 
banc) (holding that the divorcée effectively waived any interest in her husband’s pen-
sion and was not entitled to payment).  Often, the plan administrator will file an inter-
pleader action to determine the proper recipient of the death benefit.  E.g., id. at 278. 
39 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000). 
40 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 852 (1997) (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Work-
ers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)).  The Supreme Court in Boggs em-
phasized the objective of the anti-alienation provision by noting that it “‘can be seen to 
bespeak a pension law protective policy of special intensity:  Retirement funds shall 
remain inviolate until retirement.’”  Id. at 851 (quoting JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. 
WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 547 (2d ed. 1995)). 
41 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). 
42 Id. § 1056(d)(2). 
43 Id. § 1056(d)(3)(A).  As one treatise explains: 
A QDRO is a judgment, decree or order (including approval of a property set-
tlement agreement) made pursuant to a state domestic relations law (i.e., di-
vorce law) which relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, 
or marital property rights.  In order to be “qualified”, the QDRO must: 
• Create or recognize the existence of an alternate payee’s right, or assign 
to an alternate payee the right, to receive all or a portion of a partici-
pant’s pension plan benefits. 
• Not alter the amount or form or benefits otherwise payable under the 
terms of the plan. 
• Specify the name and last known mailing address of the participant and 
any alternate payee covered by the QDRO. 
• Specify the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid 
to the alternate payee, or, alternatively, the manner in which the amount 
or percentage is to be calculated. 
• Name the plan covered by the QDRO. 
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The applicability of the anti-alienation provision often arises in 
connection with beneficiary waivers of ERISA pension plan benefits.  
The issue is whether a waiver is an “assignment or alienation,” and 
thus only allowed if it satisfies one of the anti-alienation exceptions.44  
The first step in addressing this question is to define “assignment or 
alienation.”  Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed 
the definition of these terms, it has referred to a regulation defining 
an “assignment or alienation” as “‘[a]ny direct or indirect arrange-
ment whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary’ an 
interest enforceable against a plan to ‘all or any part of a plan benefit 
payment which is, or may become, payable to the participant or bene-
ficiary.’”45
II.  THE MINORITY RULE 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and 
Sixth Circuits support the minority rule—not giving effect to a waiver 
of ERISA plan benefits by a beneficiary and, instead, relying solely on 
the beneficiary designated on the participant’s beneficiary form.46  
The minority view relies on three primary arguments:  (1) the plan 
documents argument, (2) the efficiency and uniformity of administra-
tion argument, and (3) the anti-alienation argument.47
• Specify the number of payments or the period of time to which the 
QDRO relates. 
BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 150.08[5][b].  The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 
added the QDRO, QPSA, and QJSA provisions to ERISA in order to protect the inter-
est of spouses in each other’s pension benefits.  See Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (stating the act’s purpose as amending ER-
ISA to “provide for greater equity under private pension plans for workers and their 
spouses and dependents by taking into account changes in work patterns, the status of 
marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial contribution to that partner-
ship of spouses who work both in and outside the home”). 
44 See, e.g., McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied, No. 05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007) (emphasizing that a waiver, 
though conceptually distinct from an “‘assignment or alienation[,]’ may nevertheless 
be prohibited”). 
45 Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)–13(c)(1)(ii) (1997)). 
46 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (citing relevant cases and observing that 
the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit whose decisions comprehensively support the mi-
nority view).  The minority rule has also garnered support from the Department of La-
bor in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court of Texas.  Brief for the Secretary of La-
bor, United States Department of Labor, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12-
13, Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. 2003) (No. 01-0447), 2002 WL 32349562. 
47 See McGowan, 423 F.3d at 251 (Becker, J., concurring) (summarizing the major-
ity opinion’s three primary arguments). 
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A.  The Plan Documents Argument:  McMillan and Egelhoff 
The plan documents argument interprets ERISA’s fiduciary duties 
provision, § 1104, as requiring plan administrators to pay the benefi-
ciary listed on the beneficiary form without consulting any other 
documents to determine the correct beneficiary.48  The first federal 
appellate court to endorse the minority rule based on the plan docu-
ments argument was the Sixth Circuit in McMillan v. Parrott.49  
McMillan is the paradigmatic beneficiary waiver case.  Dr. Norman 
Parrott was a participant in “two vested ERISA [pension] plans.”50  At 
the time of his death, he was married to Claudia, who was his third 
wife.51  However, the designated beneficiary on his ERISA plan docu-
ments was Barbara, his second wife.52
Dr. Parrott had filed his beneficiary form four years prior to his 
death, while he was still married to Barbara.53  Later that same year, he 
and Barbara divorced, signing a property settlement agreement.54  
The agreement included “a broad waiver clause in which each spouse 
relinquished ‘any and all’ claims he or she might have against the 
other.”55
After Dr. Parrott’s death, the plan administrator faced the  ques-
tion of which party was the proper beneficiary:  Barbara or Dr. 
Parrott’s estate?56  The plan administrator sought a declaratory judg-
ment from the district court to answer this question.57  The district 
court responded with two rulings.  First, Claudia, as the surviving 
spouse, was entitled to a QPSA for fifty percent of the plan benefits;58 
48 See id. at 246 (arguing that the fiduciary duties provision “dictates that it is the 
documents on file with the Plan, and not outside private agreements between benefici-
aries and participants, that determine the rights of the parties”). 
49 913 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1990). 
50 Id. at 310. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 311. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  Later in the opinion, the court noted that even if it were to adopt the fed-
eral common law approach, the waiver in the property settlement agreement would 
not be specific enough to be enforced because it did not “specifically refer to the 
spouse’s rights as a beneficiary in an ERISA plan.”  Id. at 312. 
56 Id. at 311. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.; see also supra note 2 (discussing QPSAs).  In summarizing the district court’s 
decision, the Sixth Circuit cites Internal Revenue Code provisions 26 U.S.C. §§ 
401(a)(11)(A), 417(c)(2) (2000).  McMillan, 913 F.2d at 311.  The language in the In-
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and second, Barbara had waived her right to the other half of the plan 
benefits through the waiver clause in the property settlement agree-
ment.59
Barbara appealed the district court’s ruling as to the waiver, and 
the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the divorce settlement was not 
an effective waiver of Barbara’s rights as beneficiary.60  The Court of 
Appeals based its holding on ERISA’s requirement that the “plan ad-
ministrator discharge his duties ‘in accordance with the documents 
and instruments governing the plan.’”61  The court noted that both 
pension plans provided that “[e]ach Participant shall be given the op-
portunity in an original election to designate a Beneficiary and from 
time to time the Participant may file with the Plan Administrator a 
new or revised designation in such form as the Plan Administrator 
shall provide.”62  The court then applied ERISA’s plan documents re-
quirement to the beneficiary language of the plan, and concluded 
that “the documents control, and those name Barbara Parrott.”63
The McMillan court’s analysis is not unsupported.  In Egelhoff v. 
Egelhoff, the Supreme Court used similar reasoning to hold that ERISA 
preempted a Washington statute that automatically revoked the des-
ignation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset.64  Spe-
cifically, the Court found that the Washington statute 
runs counter to ERISA’s commands that a plan shall “specify the basis on 
which payments are made to and from the plan,” and that the fiduciary 
shall administer the plan “in accordance with the documents and in-
struments governing the plan,” making payments to a “beneficiary” who 
is “designated by a participant, or by the terms of [the] plan.”
65
ternal Revenue Code closely parallels ERISA’s QPSA provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 
(2000). 
59 McMillan, 913 F.2d at 311.  Claudia, Dr. Parrott’s children, and Dr. Parrott’s  
estate reached a court-approved agreement dividing the remaining fifty percent of the 
plan benefits.  Id. 
60 Id. at 312. 
61 Id. at 311 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000)); see also supra notes 34-38 
and accompanying text (discussing ERISA’s fiduciary duties provisions). 
62 McMillan, 913 F.2d at 311. 
63 Id. at 311-12. 
64 532 U.S. 141, 144, 150 (2001).  See generally Jonathan Dotson, Comment, Egel-
hoff v. Egelhoff:  The Supreme Court’s Latest Attempt To Clarify ERISA Preemption and the 
Decision’s Effect on Texas State Law, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (2002) (discussing ERISA’s 
express preemption of state law and the effects of Egelhoff). 
65 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (citations omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(8), 
1102(b)(4), 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000)). 
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Although the reasoning in Egelhoff is similar to the reasoning of 
the plan documents approach to beneficiary waivers, several circuits 
have declined to apply Egelhoff because its holding was based on the 
preemption of state law rather than the application of federal com-
mon law.66
B.  The Efficiency and Uniformity of Administration Argument:  Fox Valley 
The efficiency and uniformity of administration argument is an 
extension of the plan documents argument.  The theory is that requir-
ing the plan administrator to distribute the death benefit to the 
named beneficiary furthers one of ERISA’s primary purposes:  the 
simple and uniform administration of pension plans.67  In his dissent-
ing opinion in Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction Workers Pension Fund v. 
Brown, Judge Easterbrook explained the benefits of such a bright-line 
rule:  “Rules requiring payment to named beneficiaries yield simple 
administration, avoid double liability, and ensure that beneficiaries 
get what’s coming quickly, without the folderol essential under less-
certain rules.”68
C.  The Anti-Alienation Argument:  McGowan 
The anti-alienation argument relies on ERISA’s anti-alienation 
provision, § 1056(d).69  Because that provision is limited to pension 
66 See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 
2004), cert. denied sub nom. Finch v. Galaway, 544 U.S. 1056 (2005) (“[T]he holding of 
Egelhoff is inapplicable to the present case because Egelhoff does not address the appli-
cation of federal common law to ERISA plans. . . . This court sees no reason to extend 
the scope of Egelhoff to find that it preempts federal common law in addition to state 
statutes.”). 
67 See McMillan, 913 F.2d at 312 (arguing that the plan documents approach “ful-
fills the intent of Congress that ERISA plans be uniform in their interpretation and 
simple in their application”). 
68 897 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  The beneficiary 
waiver issue is an example of a question impacted by theories of statutory interpreta-
tion.  See Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter?  A Case Study, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (2000) (citing Fox Valley as an example of a case that reflects 
the divergent theories of statutory interpretation of Judges Easterbrook and Posner).  
Judge Easterbrook is well known for his textualist view of statutory interpretation.  Id. 
at 1409.  In contrast, Judge Posner, who joined the majority in Fox Valley, is recognized 
as taking a pragmatic view of statutory interpretation.  Id. 
69 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000); see also supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text 
(discussing ERISA’s anti-alienation provision). 
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plans,70 this argument applies only to such plans.  As of the writing of 
this Comment, McGowan v. NJR Service Corp.71 is the most recent bene-
ficiary waiver case decided by a federal appellate court based on the 
anti-alienation argument. 
Although the Third Circuit adopted the minority rule in 
McGowan, the nature of the opinion provides insight into the complex 
and uncertain law surrounding beneficiary waivers.  Judge Van Ant-
werpen wrote the main opinion holding in favor of the minority rule, 
and he was persuaded by all three of the common arguments:  anti-
alienation, plan documents, and efficiency and uniformity of admini-
stration.72  Judge Becker concurred with the principal opinion’s ap-
proval of the anti-alienation argument, but he rejected the other two 
arguments.73  Judge Fuentes, rejecting all three arguments, dis-
sented.74  The result was a 2-1 decision in favor of the minority rule, 
with a controlling holding based on the anti-alienation argument.  
Since this argument can apply only to pension plans, the Third Cir-
cuit’s analysis supports the minority rule concerning pension plan 
beneficiary waivers and the federal common law rule with respect to 
welfare plan beneficiary waivers.75
The factual situation in McGowan is different from that in 
McMillan.76  Shortly before he retired from New Jersey Natural Gas 
70 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided 
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”(emphasis added)). 
71 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Jan. 3, 
2006) (No. 05-853). 
72 Id. at 245-50. 
73 Id. at 253-55 (Becker, J., concurring). 
74 Id. at 255-60 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
75 The only position the Third Circuit panel clearly adopted was in support of the 
minority rule for pension plan beneficiary waivers.  The McGowan opinion could be 
interpreted to suggest the federal common law approach for welfare plans, because the 
anti-alienation argument applies only to pension plans.  Supra note 70 and accompany-
ing text.  However, this is not the Third Circuit’s holding in McGowan, and it is not 
clear that the judges considered the impact of their reasoning on welfare plan benefi-
ciary waivers. 
76 McGowan “arises in [the] unusual factual context” of an attempted change to 
the survivor beneficiary of a QJSA after the participant has retired and annuity pay-
ments have commenced.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting De-
nial of Certiorari at 7-8, McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., No. 05-853 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007), 
available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2006/2pet/6invit/2005-0853.pet.ami.inv.pdf.  
The factual situation in McGowan does not lend itself to the application of the federal 
common law rule because, unlike waivers outside the postretirement QJSA context, 
ERISA contains specific provisions detailing the requirements for a spouse to waive an 
interest in a QJSA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); see also Brief of the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra, at 10 (“[A] federal common law rule requiring 
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Company (NJNG), McGowan elected to receive the retirement bene-
fits he had accrued in NJNG’s retirement plan “in the form of an 
‘automatic surviving spouse option,’ creating a 50% survivor annuity 
for Rosemary,” who was his wife at the time.77  Two years later, in con-
junction with their divorce, Rosemary and McGowan entered a “Mari-
tal Settlement Agreement,” in which Rosemary “waiv[ed] any and all 
rights, title, interest or claims . . . to all bank accounts, life insurance 
policies and any right to the New Jersey Gas Company Employee Pen-
sion Plan of the Husband.”78  McGowan then contacted the plan ad-
ministrator to change the “named survivor beneficiary” from Rose-
mary, his second wife, to Shirley, his first wife.79  McGowan presented 
the plan administrator with a form, which Rosemary had signed, that 
reflected Rosemary’s consent to the change in beneficiary.  But the 
plan administrator refused the request.80  Three years later, McGowan 
again sought a change, this time to benefit Donna, his third and cur-
rent wife.81  After the plan administrator again denied his request, 
McGowan sued to compel the plan “to recognize Rosemary’s waiver 
and the subsequent nomination of Donna as the new beneficiary.”82
the plan to recognize the waiver in this situation would affirmatively conflict with ER-
ISA by purporting to determine rights to a survivor’s annuity in a manner not author-
ized by the QJSA provisions in 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000 & Supp. III 2003) or the QDRO 
provisions in 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3).”).  Despite its unique factual circumstances, 
McGowan is relevant to the subject of this Comment because the McGowan court did 
not premise its analysis on the QJSA waiver provisions, but rather on arguments gener-
ally applicable to the waiver of ERISA benefits. 
77 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 243. 
78 Id.  Note the specificity of the waiver in McGowan compared to the broader 
waiver in McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[E]ach spouse relin-
quished ‘any and all’ claims he or she might have against the other.”).  See supra note 
55 (discussing the need for a waiver to be sufficiently specific in order to be enforced).  
Judge Fuentes closed his dissenting opinion in McGowan with the following observa-
tion: 
Although in some cases there may be a dispute over whether particular lan-
guage in a divorce settlement is specific and definite enough to constitute 
waiver of a pension benefit, there is no serious dispute here as to whether 
Rosemary’s waiver was insufficient.  It clearly identified the Plan and waives all 
rights to benefits under the Plan.  Accordingly, I would give effect to Rose-
mary’s waiver. 
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 260 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
79 Id. at 243. 
80 Id.  The administrator’s reason for the denial was that “the Plan did not permit 
changes to [McGowan’s] prior contingent beneficiary election once he started receiv-
ing benefit payments.”  Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 244. 
  
2007] WAIVERS OF ERISA PLAN BENEFITS 731 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plan, 
and the Third Circuit affirmed, relying on the minority rule and the 
anti-alienation argument.83  The court held that, although “as a gen-
eral matter . . . ‘waiver’ is not the same thing as assignment or alien-
ation,” Rosemary’s beneficiary waiver “creates an ‘indirect arrange-
ment’ whereby the Plan benefits are transferred to Donna, who in 
turn gains an ‘interest enforceable against the plan.’”84  Using the de-
finition of an assignment or alienation that the Supreme Court had 
referenced in Boggs,85 the court found that the waiver was an assign-
ment or alienation in contravention of ERISA’s anti-alienation provi-
sion.86  The court bolstered its conclusion that a beneficiary waiver is 
an alienation with an analysis of ERISA’s QDRO provisions.87  Judge 
Van Antwerpen reasoned that “the QDRO provision, which recognizes 
the right to designate alternate payees under certain circumstances, 
‘give[s] rise to the strong implication that’ the designation of alter-
nate payees under other circumstances (i.e. through waivers) is ‘not 
consistent with the statutory scheme.’”88  Judge Becker, in his concur-
ring opinion, observed that 
Congress saw QDROs as the only means by which a participant or bene-
ficiary could assign or alienate his or her interest in the plan.  This is 
confirmed by the language from the 1984 Senate Report noting that, ab-
sent a QDRO, the participant’s first spouse is still entitled to benefits 
upon the participant’s death.
89
The reasoning employed by Judges Van Antwerpen and Becker in 
McGowan is representative of the anti-alienation argument in the mi-
nority rule decisions. 
83 Id. at 244, 250; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing the lim-
ited nature of the Third Circuit’s holding). 
84 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 248, 249 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)–13(c)(1)(ii) 
(1997)). 
85 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 851 (1997); see also supra note 45 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Supreme Court’s reference in Boggs to 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-
13(c)(1)(ii) (1997)). 
86 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 248. 
87 Id. at 249-50; id. at 251-52 (Becker, J., concurring). 
88 Id. at 250 (quoting Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847).  Judge Van Antwerpen’s statement is 
not a clear implication of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Boggs.  See McGowan, 423 
F.3d at 252 n.8 (Becker, J., concurring) (“While I . . . believ[e] that Judge Van Antwer-
pen correctly interprets the Supreme Court’s discussion of the QDRO provision in 
Boggs . . . I feel constrained to note that the Supreme Court’s congressional silence ju-
risprudence is somewhat of a patchwork.” (citations omitted)). 
89 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 251-52 (Becker, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
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III.  THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW APPROACH 
The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have adopted the 
federal common law approach—ruling that ERISA does not specifi-
cally address beneficiary waivers and applying federal common law to 
give effect to beneficiary waivers if the waivers meet certain criteria.90  
These courts have rejected the plan documents argument, the effi-
ciency and uniformity argument, and the anti-alienation argument 
(the latter being relevant only in pension plan cases).91  Instead, they 
apply federal common law to decide whether the waiver is effective.92
A.  Requirements for an Effective Waiver 
The federal common law rule that the courts have applied to de-
termine whether a beneficiary waiver is effective has been consistent 
across these circuits.93  “That rule is that a named ERISA beneficiary 
may waive his or her entitlement to the proceeds of an ERISA  
plan . . . , provided that the waiver is explicit, voluntary, and made in 
good faith.”94  Previously, there had been some differences in the in-
terpretation of the federal common law rule,95 but those differences 
have been resolved.96
90 See supra note 5 (citing cases adopting the federal common law approach).  
Nearly all of the state appellate courts that have addressed the issue have held in favor 
of the federal common law approach.  E.g., MacInnes v. MacInnes, 677 N.W.2d 889, 
893 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, 701 N.W.2d 
320, 328-29 (Neb. 2005) (per curiam); Silber v. Silber, 786 N.E.2d 1263, 1268-69 (N.Y. 
2003); Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 724-27 (Tex. 2003).  See generally Anthony J. 
Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825 
(2005) (discussing the role of state courts in the development of federal common law). 
91 See, e.g., Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting the plan documents, efficiency and uniformity, and anti-alienation 
arguments). 
92 E.g., Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 
275, 281 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Trs. of Iron Workers Local 451 Annuity Fund v. 
O’Brien, 937 F. Supp. 346, 350-51 (D. Del. 1996). 
93 Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911, 914-17 (8th Cir. 1995) and Brandon v. Travelers 
Insurance Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1994) perform a thorough analysis of the 
federal common law approach across the circuits and reach a similar formulation of 
the general federal common law rule. 
94 Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 2000). 
95 In Estate of Altobelli v. International Business Machines Corp., Chief Judge Wilkinson 
noted the differences in the federal common law rule in his dissenting opinion: 
[P]lan administrators will have to assess whether the waiver is executed with 
sufficient specificity to trump the beneficiary designation in the plan docu-
ments.  Courts have reached contradictory conclusions in such situations.  
Compare Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1989) (term stating 
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B.  Rejecting the Plan Documents Argument 
The courts that reject the plan documents argument have a sim-
ple refrain:  ERISA “does not either expressly or implicitly purport to 
establish any methodology for determining the beneficiary of an ER-
ISA plan.”97  The plan documents argument is premised on a combi-
nation of three different ERISA sections.98  The most critical, § 1104, 
is a section on plan administrators’ fiduciary duties, not a section on 
distributions to beneficiaries.99  Judge Becker, concurring in 
McGowan, noted that the fiduciary duties provision “simply embodies 
the common-sense notion that a plan administrator should not take 
actions that are inconsistent with the plan’s guidelines.”100  Judge 
Becker bolstered this argument by sagely pointing out that “[n]othing 
in the language [of § 1104] prohibits the administrator from consult-
ing other documents, insofar as those documents do not conflict with 
the language of the plan.  Indeed, an administrator must consult 
that husband “shall have as his own, free of any interest of [his wife], his in-
terest in the profit-sharing plan of his employer” held not to waive wife’s bene-
ficiary interest in plan), with Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 275 (term stating that the 
parties “waive any interest or claim in and to any retirement, pension, profit-
sharing and/or annuity plans resulting from the employment of the other 
party” held to waive wife’s beneficiary interest in pension plan). 
77 F.3d at 83 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting). 
96 See Mohamed, 53 F.3d at 915 (noting that the issue driving the difference in the 
federal common law rule has been resolved and that case law now “makes it clear that 
the law does not require that the word ‘beneficiary’ appear in the language of the 
agreement in order for a beneficiary interest to be divested”); see also Clift v. Clift, 210 
F.3d 268, 270-72 (5th Cir. 2000) (analyzing Lyman and Fox Valley in its determination of 
the language sufficient to constitute a waiver under the federal common law rule and 
coming to the same conclusion as Mohamed). 
97 Manning, 212 F.3d at 872; see also Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 280 (“ERISA is silent on 
the issue of what constitutes a proper waiver . . . .”). 
98 These provisions are 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1102, 1104 (2000).  See supra note 65 
and accompanying text (setting out the plan documents argument). 
99 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing § 1104).  Section 1104 
alone “is a very thin reed upon which to find complete conflict preemption.”  Manning, 
212 F.3d at 872. 
100 McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 254 (3d Cir. 2005) (Becker, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, No. 05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007); see also Manning, 
212 F.3d at 872 (“Section 1104 defines the fiduciary duties owed by the plan adminis-
trator to plan participants and beneficiaries.”).  The title of § 1104(a), “Prudent man 
standard of care,” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000), lends additional support to the argu-
ment that § 1104 is intended to protect plan participants from rogue plan administra-
tors rather than to describe detailed procedures for how plan administrators should 
carry out their daily tasks. 
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other documents to determine whether a participant has obtained a 
valid QDRO.”101
In the wake of Egelhoff, some argue that the view that the plan 
documents approach does not specifically address beneficiary waivers 
has been invalidated.102  But this argument confuses the preemption 
of state law with the preemption of federal common law, and there is 
no reason to believe Egelhoff intended the latter.103  Given ERISA’s 
broad preemption clause, there will be many cases in which ERISA 
“relates to” an issue but does not specifically address the issue; this is 
where the need for federal common law arises.104
C.  Rejecting the Efficiency and Uniformity of Administration Argument 
The efficiency and uniformity of administration argument claims 
that plan administrators will be overburdened by having to look at 
property settlement agreements and decide if they contain a valid 
waiver of a beneficiary’s rights to ERISA plan benefits.105  There are 
two primary counterarguments to this view.  First, “[n]o such addi-
tional burdens will be imposed because, under the ERISA statutory 
scheme, a plan administrator must investigate the marital history of a 
participant and determine whether any domestic relations orders exist 
that could affect the distribution of benefits.”106  Second, since there 
101 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 254 (Becker, J., concurring).  Judge Becker explained: 
[T]he provision authorizing QDROs explicitly states that such orders are ex-
empt from ERISA’s anti-alienation clause but says nothing whatsoever about  
§ 1104(a)(1)(D).  This suggests that Congress simply did not see a conflict be-
tween the requirement that plan administrators perform their duties “in ac-
cordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan” and the 
requirement that they give effect to a transfer of benefits pursuant to a 
QDRO . . . . 
Id.; see also supra note 43 (defining a QDRO as a “judgment, decree or order . . . made 
pursuant to a state domestic relations law” and listing QDRO qualification criteria). 
102 See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 
2004), cert. denied sub nom. Finch v. Galaway, 544 U.S. 1056 (2005) (discussing Egelhoff’s 
effect on beneficiary waivers); see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Egelhoff and its applicability to beneficiary waivers). 
103 See Finch, 395 F.3d at 242 (“This court sees no reason to extend the scope of 
Egelhoff to find that it preempts federal common law in addition to state statutes.”). 
104 See Manning, 212 F.3d at 870-71 (noting that the need to apply federal common 
law arises when ERISA does not specifically address an issue). 
105 See McGowan, 423 F.3d at 247 (“It cannot be denied that requiring administra-
tors to review contractual language under an amorphous ‘reasonable person’ standard 
will create a risk of litigation and administrative burdens . . . .”). 
106 Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 
282 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).  In fact, Fox Valley “arose from just such an investiga-
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appears to have been no significant litigation in the circuits adopting 
the federal common law approach over plan administrators’ improper 
interpretation of waivers, perhaps the task presents no serious diffi-
culty for plan administrators.107  If administrative burdens are mini-
mal, the efficiency and uniformity of administration argument pro-
vides little support for choosing the minority rule over the federal 
common law approach. 
D.  Rejecting the Anti-Alienation Argument 
The circuits adopting the federal common law approach have re-
jected the anti-alienation argument by asserting that a waiver is not an 
assignment or alienation.108  “Waiver does not involve a transfer of 
tion.”  Id.  The efficiency argument primarily concerns additional work—identifying 
waivers and determining if they are effective.  Both sides of the argument acknowledge 
that there would be some additional administrative work in beneficiary waiver situa-
tions, such as additional actuarial calculations, but “[t]hese kinds of calculations are de 
rigeur for plan administrators.”  McGowan, 423 F.3d at 255 (Becker, J., concurring). 
Judge Becker argued that minor administrative inconvenience is not a persuasive effi-
ciency argument.  Id. 
107 Although this is difficult to observe directly, the best argument that waiver in-
terpretation imposes a significant administrative burden is the development of federal 
common law in response to Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1989).  See 
supra notes 95-96 (discussing the Lyman issue and its resolution); McGowan, 423 F.3d at 
247 (pointing only to Lyman-related litigation as evidence of increased administrative 
burden).  With the resolution of the Lyman issue, however, this increased burden does 
not remain a concern.  Anecdotal evidence seems to support the conclusion that there 
are no longer significant administrative costs involved in reviewing purported waivers: 
Must a plan take every purported waiver into court in order to figure out 
whether it applies to the beneficiary designation?  We don’t have a satisfying 
response to this objection, other than to note [that] in our own practice we 
have been able to solve dozens of beneficiary disputes without yet having been 
forced into an interpleader action.  We acknowledge, however, that, while one 
can theoretically assert that the plan’s cost in determining the correct payee 
can be charged against the proceeds otherwise payable to the beneficiary, as a 
practical matter there will be some costs that cannot be avoided if the plan is 
forced to examine divorce decrees. 
Who Is the Payee, Part VIII:  Altobelli v. IBM and the Other Beneficiary Waiver Cases, ERISA 
LITIG. REPTR., Aug. 1996, 14, 17 [hereinafter Who Is the Payee]. 
108 See, e.g., Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 279 (“These provisions focus on the assignment 
or alienation of benefits by a participant, not the waiver of a right to payment of bene-
fits made by a designated beneficiary.”).  In addition to distinguishing waivers from 
assignments, some of the early federal common law decisions, such as Fox Valley, at-
tempt to discredit the anti-alienation argument by asserting that the anti-alienation 
provisions apply only to participants, not to beneficiaries.  Id.  Boggs seems to suggest 
that the anti-alienation provision applies equally to participants and beneficiaries.  
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 258 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
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rights; it is merely a relinquishment.”109  The most plausible counter-
argument is that, in certain situations, a waiver combined with a sub-
sequent beneficiary designation functions as an indirect assignment.110  
Judge Easterbrook noted this possibility in his Fox Valley dissent:  “The 
designated beneficiary may give away the money the instant she re-
ceives it.  Waiver is an anticipatory gift, to whoever is next in line un-
der the Fund’s rules . . . .”111  Judge Fuentes, dissenting in McGowan, 
recognized the problem with this argument:  “[S]uch a reading allows 
third-party actions to invalidate what would otherwise be valid waivers.  
Indeed, the majority would appear to prohibit all waivers, even 
though, in many cases, there will be no ‘renomination’ at issue.”112
An examination of ERISA policy further supports a rejection of 
the anti-alienation argument.  In Estate of Altobelli v. International Busi-
ness Machines Corp., the Fourth Circuit observed that waiver is consis-
tent with ERISA’s purposes: 
We agree with the Seventh Circuit [in Fox Valley] that the anti-alienation 
clause does not apply to a beneficiary’s waiver.  As the Supreme Court 
has noted, the purpose of the clause is “to safeguard a stream of income 
for pensioners (and their dependents . . . ).”  To bar a waiver in favor of 
the pensioner himself would not advance that purpose.
113
Furthermore, the courts have interpreted the legislative intent 
behind the anti-alienation provision to be the protection of plan 
benefits from creditors and “unscrupulous predators preying upon 
participants and beneficiaries by offering inadequate immediate grati-
fication in exchange for the long-term benefits ERISA is designed to 
guarantee.”114  “These concerns are not nearly as strong with respect 
to waiver” as they are with respect to assignment, where the benefits 
are transferred to a third party.115  The anti-alienation argument does 
not provide support for a bright-line rule preventing the recognition 
of all beneficiary waivers of ERISA plan benefits. 
109 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 256 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
110 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing such a scenario in 
McGowan). 
111 Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 282-83 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
112 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 257 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).  Judge Fuentes noted that if 
the combination of waiver and renomination is what results in the violation of the anti-
alienation provision, then only the renomination should be invalidated.  Id. 
113 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l 
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)) (internal citation omitted). 
114 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 256 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. 
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IV.  THE OPTIMAL APPROACH 
The federal common law approach is the best approach to bene-
ficiary waivers of ERISA plan benefits because it is in accord with  
ERISA’s statutory language and provides equitable results consistent 
with ERISA’s purpose.  Moreover, from a practical perspective, the 
federal common law approach is the best of the available options and 
does not generate the absurd consequences of the minority rule. 
A.  The Federal Common Law Approach Provides Equitable Results  
That Are Consistent with ERISA’s Primary Purpose 
The federal common law approach is preferable to the minority 
rule because it is consistent with the overriding purpose of ERISA:  to 
ensure that employees “receive the pensions and other benefits that 
they were led to believe they would receive upon retirement.”116  By 
adhering to this principle, ERISA is intended to generate equitable 
outcomes, an aim that is reflected in both the legislative history and 
the statute itself.  The legislative history indicates that ERISA “is con-
cerned with improving the fairness and effectiveness of qualified re-
tirement plans in their vital role of providing retirement income.”117  
ERISA’s § 1001, titled “Congressional findings and declaration of pol-
icy,” clearly states that Congress enacted the statute because “it is . . . 
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the 
protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the 
free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring 
the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.”118  
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) confirms ERISA’s equitable 
focus by stating that REA’s purpose in amending ERISA was to “pro-
116 Ryan P. Barry, Comment, ERISA’s Purpose:  The Conveyance of Information from 
Trustee to Beneficiary, 31 CONN. L. REV. 735, 735 (1999) (citing Welfare and Pension Plan 
Legislation:  Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 Before the H. Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. 
on Educ. and Labor, Part 2, 93d Cong. 1 (1973) (statement of Rep. John H. Dent, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Labor)).  According to one of ERISA’s co-sponsors, Senator 
Jacob K. Javits, ERISA is “a pension ‘bill of rights.’”  120 CONG. REC. 29935 (1974) 
(statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).  ERISA’s focus on providing benefits to those ex-
pecting the benefits underlies numerous ERISA provisions.  See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 
U.S. 833, 852 (1997) (“Besides the anti-alienation provision, Congress has enacted 
other protective measures to guarantee that retirement funds are there when a plan’s 
participants and beneficiaries expect them.”). 
117 H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4676. 
118 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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vide for greater equity under private pension plans for workers and 
their spouses.”119
The greatest benefit of the federal common law approach is that it 
furthers ERISA’s primary purpose by ensuring that plan participants 
and beneficiaries receive the benefits they are expecting.  Suppose, 
for example, that an ex-spouse who previously waived any claim to re-
tirement benefits now seeks those benefits at the expense of a surviv-
ing spouse.120  The deceased spouse and the surviving spouse likely 
planned their retirement with the expectation that the surviving 
spouse would receive the benefits at issue upon the deceased spouse’s 
death.  In contrast, the ex-spouse could not reasonably expect to re-
ceive the benefits after having waived any claim to them.  Applying the 
federal common law approach guarantees that the person with the 
reasonable expectation of receiving the benefits actually receives 
them. 
There are several colorable responses to the expectations argu-
ment.  First, one might argue that, although ERISA’s primary purpose 
is to ensure that participants and beneficiaries receive the benefits 
they are expecting, the person whose expectations might otherwise be 
frustrated is the surviving spouse, and a surviving spouse is neither a 
participant nor a beneficiary.  While this argument may be technically 
accurate, it ignores the fact that ERISA places the spouses of partici-
pants in a protected class.  The QPSA and QJSA demonstrate Con-
gress’s intent to protect participants’ spouses.121  Moreover, the argu-
ment ignores the fact that not recognizing the waiver would thwart the 
participant’s expectation that the benefits would be available to sup-
port the surviving spouse. 
The second counterargument one might make is that, in some 
cases, the participant’s decision not to change the beneficiary desig-
nated in the plan documents indicates that the participant intended 
the ex-spouse to remain a beneficiary, and that this imputed intention 
119 Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) 
(emphasis added). 
120 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing this scenario). 
121 See supra note 2 (discussing ERISA’s QPSA and QJSA provisions).  The QPSA 
and QJSA provisions reveal that Congress wanted to provide a participant’s spouse the 
right to at least fifty percent of the participant’s plan benefits at the expense of other 
rightful beneficiaries.  How Congress might have viewed the rights of surviving spouses 
vis-à-vis named beneficiaries who waived any claim to benefits is debatable. 
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renders reasonable an ex-spouse’s expectation of benefits.122  This ar-
gument presumes without justification that the decision not to change 
the beneficiary in the plan documents was a conscious one.  Further, 
the argument depends on the additional improbable assumption that, 
although the participant and ex-spouse have signed a divorce agree-
ment with a specific waiver of ERISA plan benefits, the participant 
changed his mind and neither the participant nor the ex-spouse 
thought it was necessary to take any action to ensure the ex-spouse re-
ceived the benefits—other than to not change the beneficiary who 
had been designated on the predivorce plan documents.  While the 
objections to the expectations argument are plausible, ultimately they 
are unpersuasive. 
The federal common law approach honors the intentions of the 
parties and generates equitable outcomes.123  The minority rule con-
sistently disregards the intentions of participants and beneficiaries in 
favor of the plan documents, thereby creating inequitable out-
comes.124  While the adherence to plan documents and the simple 
administration of ERISA plans are important goals of the legislative 
scheme, they are not the primary reasons why Congress enacted ER-
ISA.  The minority rule opts for strained interpretations of ERISA’s 
detailed provisions while ignoring its primary purpose, and the opin-
ions written by judges who advocate for the minority rule clearly em-
phasize the preeminence of simple administration and adherence to 
plan documents over equitable outcomes.  In his dissenting opinion 
in Fox Valley, Judge Ripple stated, “ERISA’s command that a plan be 
administered in accordance with the plan’s documents must be our 
primary concern in fashioning a waiver rule.”125  This reasoning disre-
gards ERISA’s primary purpose in favor of its secondary goals. 
122 See Norwood, supra note 3, at 96-97 (discussing the problem of determining the 
participant’s intentions when the ex-spouse asserts that the participant intended the 
ex-spouse to remain the beneficiary despite a waiver in a divorce agreement). 
123 The federal common law test, unlike the minority bright-line rule, looks to the 
intent of the parties.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text (setting out the re-
quirements under federal common law for an ERISA beneficiary to waive her entitle-
ments); see also, e.g., Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (“Congress’s provision for QDROs reveals that, in some situations, it deems 
the intent of the parties sufficiently important to override the policy of simplified ad-
ministration.”). 
124 See, e.g., Altobelli, 77 F.3d at 82 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (“Here, the equities 
of the majority’s disposition seem tempting, but ERISA’s provisions compel a contrary 
outcome.”). 
125 Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 
284 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
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B.  The Federal Common Law Approach Conforms to ERISA’s  
Statutory Language and Legislative History 
In addition to being compatible with ERISA’s primary purpose, 
the federal common law approach is consistent with ERISA’s language 
and its legislative history.  Specifically, the federal common law ap-
proach is not in conflict with ERISA’s plan documents and anti-
alienation provisions. 
1.  Addressing the Plan Documents Argument 
The plan documents provision does not prevent the use of the 
federal common law approach.  As Judge Becker recognized in 
McGowan, the plan documents provision is concerned with fiduciary 
duties and does not prevent the use of outside documents.126  Judge 
Becker observed that the allowance for outside documents in effecting 
QDROs shows that Congress did not see a conflict between the plan 
documents provision and the use of outside documents in deciding 
who should receive payment of ERISA benefits.127  Furthermore, 
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc. indicates that the Su-
preme Court did not see a conflict between the plan documents pro-
vision and requiring plan administrators to consult garnishment or-
ders in determining who should receive ERISA welfare plan 
benefits.128
The plan documents provision is purely a fiduciary duties provi-
sion and is not relevant to the determination of whether a non-
participant waiver of benefits should be recognized.  The attempts to 
make the statutory language relevant to the analysis of nonparticipant 
waivers require an unduly broad interpretation of the plan documents 
provision that precludes the plan administrator from consulting any 
outside documents.  This interpretation is untenable, given that both 
126 423 F.3d at 254 (Becker, J., concurring); see supra notes 100-101 and accompa-
nying text (providing Judge Becker’s explanation of why ERISA provisions allow the 
consultation of additional documents). 
127 McGowan, 423 F.3d at 254 (Becker, J., concurring). 
128 486 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1988) (“Unfortunately, ERISA itself offers no express an-
swer as to whether welfare benefit plan trustees must comply with garnishment orders 
like those respondent is seeking to enforce.  In our view, however, certain ERISA pro-
visions, and several aspects of the statute’s structure, indicate that Congress did not 
intend to forbid the use of state-law mechanisms of executing judgments against  
ERISA welfare benefit plans, even when those mechanisms prevent plan participants 
from receiving their benefits.”). 
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Congress and the Supreme Court have sanctioned actions that require 
plan administrators to consult outside documents. 
2.  Addressing the Anti-Alienation Argument 
The anti-alienation provision also does not preclude adopting the 
federal common law approach to the waiver of ERISA plan benefits.  
Beyond the clear-cut position that a waiver simply is not an assignment 
or alienation,129 at least two other arguments suggest that the anti-
alienation provision does not prevent waivers:  (1) the REA’s legisla-
tive history calls into question any definition of an assignment or 
alienation under ERISA that includes waivers; and (2) the IRS’s inter-
nal position is that disclaimers by named beneficiaries of ERISA pen-
sion plans after the participant’s death do not violate ERISA’s anti-
alienation provision. 
Legislative history indicates that the Congress enacting the REA 
did not view a QDRO as conflicting with ERISA’s anti-alienation provi-
sion.  The Senate Committee Report on the REA states that “[i]n the 
case of a [QDRO], the bill clarifies that such order does not result in a 
prohibited assignment or alienation of benefits under the spendthrift 
provisions of the Code or ERISA.”130  The use of “clarifies” indicates 
that the 1984 Congress did not view the anti-alienation provision as 
applying to QDROs, even prior to the adoption of the REA.131  Signifi-
cantly, this suggests that the 1984 Congress viewed the anti-alienation 
provision as containing certain inherent exceptions.132  Moreover, this 
interpretation of ERISA’s legislative history weighs heavily against the 
argument that the 1984 Congress intended QDROs to be the only ex-
129 See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text (citing opinions that distinguish 
waivers from alienations and assignments). 
130 S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 3 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2549 
(emphasis added). 
131 But see Mackey, 486 U.S. at 839-40 (cautioning that determining the intent of a 
prior Congress based on the belief of a subsequent Congress is potentially “hazardous” 
(quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960))). 
132 The 1984 Congress’s use of “clarifies” suggests inherent exceptions to the anti-
alienation provision when one considers that the 1984 Congress’s action closely fol-
lowed case law recognizing an exception to the anti-alienation provision for intra-
familial transfers.  See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. First Va. Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 
690 (4th Cir. 1983) (“A judicial exception has been carved out of this seemingly abso-
lute prohibition.  If the debt is support due the employee’s spouse or children, his in-
terest in the plan is subject to garnishment.  The exception is premised upon the stat-
ute’s broad purpose to provide protection for employees and their families, so that 
intra-familial transfers are not to be viewed in the same light as an involuntary transfer 
for the benefit of a third-party creditor.” (citations omitted)). 
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ception to the anti-alienation provision with respect to divorce situa-
tions. 
The IRS’s General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 39,858 states 
that disclaimers by named beneficiaries of ERISA pension plans after 
the participant’s death do not violate ERISA’s anti-alienation provi-
sion.133  This internal IRS position, while not authoritative, is persua-
sive in its argument that disclaimers are not assignments or alien-
ations.134  GCM 39,858 concludes that “a disclaimer of benefits under 
a qualified plan does not constitute a prohibited ‘assignment or alien-
ation’ of plan benefits” under ERISA.135  It notes that numerous areas 
of the law agree that waivers and disclaimers are not transfers,136 and it 
finds “no evidence that Congress intended to preclude a spouse from 
disclaiming or renouncing benefits under a qualified plan payable af-
ter the participant’s death.”137
C.  Assessing the Available Approaches to Beneficiary Waivers 
Although the minority rule and the federal common law approach 
are the two primary positions on the issue of beneficiary waivers, there 
are several intermediate approaches between the pure minority rule138 
on one hand, and the pure federal common law approach139 on the 
other.  The spectrum of intermediate approaches includes (1) the 
minority rule plus the use of constructive trusts,140 (2) the McGowan 
133 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,858 (Sept. 23, 1991).
134 See Who Is the Payee, supra note 107, at 16-17 (“[T]he drafters of the GCM . . . 
concluded that a valid disclaimer should not be regarded as a [sic] alienation for pur-
poses of ERISA.”). 
135 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,858 (“Because the disclaimant is regarded as never 
having accepted or received the disclaimed property, the disclaimer is not considered 
to involve a transfer of property by the disclaimant.”). 
136 In support of its conclusion, GCM 39,858 found that a disclaimer is not consid-
ered a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, the Uniform Probate Code, or trust law.  
Id. 
137 Id.  Specifically, GCM 39,858 states that “Congress determined that the spouse 
‘. . . should be involved in making choices with respect to retirement income on which 
the spouse may also rely. . . .’”  Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 12 (1984)). 
138 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing the minority rule). 
139 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the federal common law 
approach). 
140 See Norwood, supra note 3, at 97-101 (suggesting an application of the minority 
rule plus the use of constructive trusts to prevent unfair results); see also Unicare Life & 
Health Ins. Co. v. Craig, 157 F. App’x. 787, 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (Gibson, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting the use of a constructive trust to remedy a possibly inequitable out-
come resulting from an analogous ERISA dispute). 
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rule (the federal common law rule for welfare plans and the minority 
rule for pension plans),141 and (3) the federal common law approach 
without allowing renomination after a waiver.142
Although the intermediate approaches have a number of benefits 
worth noting, these benefits ultimately are outweighed by their atten-
dant problems.  The minority rule plus the use of constructive trusts 
under state law prevents unfair results and has additional advantages.  
First, the “plan administrator’s responsibilities are uniform and un-
complicated,”143 because the plan administrator only needs to pay the 
beneficiary specified on the beneficiary form.  Second, an equitable 
outcome remains available because a state court can apply a construc-
tive trust to “fashion an equitable result.”144
While at first glance this approach is appealing, further examina-
tion reveals several flaws.  One is that the process of administering and 
obtaining plan benefits is not simple in practice.  Take, for example, 
an inequitable case in which a constructive trust will ultimately be ap-
plied to the plan assets.  Under the federal common law rule, the plan 
administrator would look at the proposed waiver, determine its valid-
ity under established federal common law, and distribute the plan 
benefits to the appropriate beneficiary.  Under the constructive trust 
rule, the plan administrator will pay the plan benefits to the wrong 
person.  Then the proper beneficiary will have to rush to file a state 
constructive trust claim, wait while litigating the claim, and later—
finally—receive the plan benefits. 
The second, and most important, flaw of the constructive trust 
approach is that imposing a constructive trust is inconsistent with the 
minority rule.145  The rationale behind the minority rule is that ERISA 
141 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing McGowan and its implica-
tions). 
142 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting that invalidating a renomi-
nation may prevent a waiver from violating the anti-alienation provision). 
143 Norwood, supra note 3, at 100.  Norwood also notes an additional benefit for 
the administrator—he would no longer be a party to litigation disputing the proper 
recipient.  Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See Dotson, supra note 64, at 535 (“If allowed, the imposition of a constructive 
trust is nothing more than a back door method of frustrating ERISA’s purpose of pro-
tecting named plan beneficiaries.”); see also T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succes-
sion, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 193 (2004) (“Constructive trusts are creatures of state law, 
and the decisions of the Supreme Court have made it clear that ERISA’s preemption 
provision trumps the application of contrary state law.”). 
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speaks directly to the waiver and disallows it.146  If ERISA directly ad-
dresses an issue, then any state law on the issue, including constructive 
trust law, is preempted.147  Thus, constructive trust law cannot be ap-
plied, even after the plan benefits have been distributed.  The Su-
preme Court in Boggs emphasized this in its concluding paragraph:  
“It does not matter that respondents have sought to enforce their 
rights only after the retirement benefits have been distributed since 
their asserted rights are based on the theory that they had an interest 
in the undistributed pension plan benefits.  Their state-law claims are 
pre-empted.”148  Thus, the minority rule plus the use of constructive 
trusts under state law is not a viable approach to the problem of bene-
ficiary waivers. 
Although it is the least flawed of the intermediate approaches, the 
McGowan rule, applying the federal common law rule for welfare plans 
and the minority rule for pension plans, is also unsound.  First, it does 
not appear that any other court or any commentator has explicitly 
supported this interpretation as a solution.149  Second, although there 
are reasons why Congress chose not to apply ERISA’s anti-alienation 
provision to welfare plans (there are sufficient differences between 
the two types of ERISA plans), this solution remains unnecessarily 
complex.  It would require participants, beneficiaries, plan adminis-
trators, and the courts to distinguish between the two plan types and 
learn how to function properly under two sets of rules.  Having two 
sets of rules not only directly contradicts ERISA’s goal of uniform and 
simple administration, but it is also a suboptimal solution, in light of 
the uniformity of the federal common law approach. 
The same arguments that are marshalled against the McGowan 
rule can be applied to the third intermediate option:  the federal 
common law approach without allowing renomination after a waiver.  
Additional complexity would result from plan administrators having 
to track which plan participants have been the recipients of waivers, 
and then having to disallow those participants from electing new 
146 See supra Part II (showing why this is the case under either the plan documents 
argument or the anti-alienation argument). 
147 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (explaining ERISA’s preemption 
of relevant state law). 
148 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997); see also Dotson, supra note 64, at 534 
(quoting the same statement in Boggs as a bar on the use of constructive trusts in this 
context). 
149 This rule is an interpretation of the divided opinion in McGowan v. NJR Service 
Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 
16, 2007).  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (synthesizing McGowan’s holding). 
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beneficiaries.  Moreover, not allowing plan participants to elect new 
beneficiaries is an unsustainable outcome.  A plan participant, when 
alive, can achieve the same result as the prohibited “indirect assign-
ment” by transferring the plan benefits to the intended recipient after 
receiving the benefits and, when deceased, can achieve this result by 
executing a testamentary instrument that passes the benefits to the in-
tended recipient.  In summary, the intermediate approaches do not 
provide an adequate solution to the problem of beneficiary waivers. 
D.  The Federal Common Law Approach Avoids Absurd Results 
The federal common law approach avoids the absurd results gen-
erated by the minority rule.  Applying the minority rule and its under-
lying rationale creates numerous potential perversities, including be-
ing prevented from finding a beneficiary willing to accept the plan 
benefits or having to give the plan benefits to a named beneficiary 
who has murdered the plan participant.  To illustrate the first poten-
tial problem, assume that the beneficiary who waives her right to the 
plan benefits absolutely refuses to accept the benefits.150  Under the 
minority rule, the plan administrator could not recognize the waiver 
and would have to give the unwanted benefits to the disclaiming 
beneficiary.  As one commentator noted:  “What is a plan to do:  
sneak by the beneficiary’s house at night, jimmy open a window, and 
pour the cash into the bedroom?”151
The absurdity of the rationale behind the minority rule is eluci-
dated when one considers the situation where a named beneficiary 
murders a participant.  Nearly every state has a “slayer statute” that 
prevents a murdering heir from receiving property as a result of the 
murder.152  However, using the interpretation of either the plan docu-
ments provision or the anti-alienation provision necessary to support 
the minority rule would ultimately lead to the murderer receiving the 
participant’s ERISA benefits.  The minority rule interpretation of the 
plan documents provision is that a plan administrator must pay the 
beneficiary named on the beneficiary form.  Thus, there would be a 
150 While at first glance one might question the likelihood of a scenario where a 
beneficiary would refuse benefits, it is not an uncommon situation.  A beneficiary 
might choose to disclaim benefits because of tax consequences, possible disqualifica-
tion from public assistance for a disabled beneficiary, or purely emotional reasons. 
151 Who Is the Payee, supra note 107, at 16. 
152 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001); see also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy 
Killing and the Right To Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 844-56 (1993) (providing an over-
view of slayer statutes). 
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direct conflict between the beneficiary under ERISA and the slayer 
statute.  ERISA’s preemption provision would preempt the slayer stat-
ute, and the murderer would receive the benefits.153
The minority rule’s interpretation of the anti-alienation provision 
would lead to the same result.  Under a slayer statute, the murderer 
relinquishes his rights to the participant’s benefits.  Applying the same 
analysis that the proponents of the minority rule apply to beneficiary 
waivers, the slayer statute would qualify as an “indirect arrange-
ment . . . whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a 
right or interest enforceable against the plan.”154  Again, the slayer 
statute would be in direct conflict with ERISA and would be pre-
empted. 
The federal common law approach avoids the absurdity of the 
murderer receiving the participant’s ERISA benefits by interpreting 
the plan documents and anti-alienation provisions in a less strained 
and stringent manner.  It might, for example, allow one to conclude 
that there is no direct conflict between those provisions and state 
slayer statutes.155  Alternatively, even if one were to take a broad view 
of ERISA preemption and conclude that the slayer statutes were pre-
empted by ERISA, the federal common law approach would allow for 
the judiciary to create federal common law replicating the slayer stat-
utes.156
CONCLUSION 
The federal common law approach to waivers of ERISA plan bene-
fits by beneficiaries provides the best balance of ensuring an equitable 
outcome for participants and beneficiaries while allowing for uniform 
and simple plan administration.  The federal common law looks to 
the parties’ intentions to ensure that the individual counting on re-
ceiving ERISA plan benefits to provide for her retirement actually re-
ceives those benefits.  It is able to do this without jeopardizing uni-
formity because the federal common law for deciding whether to give 
effect to beneficiary waivers is well settled and consistent across the 
153 This issue was noted in Egelhoff, but the Court explained:  “Those statutes are 
not before us, so we do not decide the issue.”  532 U.S. at 152. 
154 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1997). 
155 Cf. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152 (leaving open this possibility). 
156 See Gallanis, supra note 145, at 189-98 (discussing the problem of increasing 
conflicts between ERISA and state succession law, and finding the development of fed-
eral common law to be the most plausible solution). 
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circuits.  The uniformity of this theory allows for simplicity in applica-
tion and, therefore, ensures that plan administrators are not overbur-
dened by interpreting possible waivers.  In light of these advantages, 
the federal common law approach should be universally adopted for 
assessing the validity of ERISA benefit waivers. 
 
